src/client/sandbox-server/main.c

   1 /* $Id$
   2  * filesystem sandbox server stub for libcaptive
   3  * Copyright (C) 2003 Jan Kratochvil <project-captive@jankratochvil.net>
   4  *
   5  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   6  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
   7  * the Free Software Foundation; exactly version 2 of June 1991 is required
   8  *
   9  * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
  10  * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
  11  * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
  12  * GNU General Public License for more details.
  13  *
  14  * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
  15  * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
  16  * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307  USA
  17  */
  18
  19
  20 #include "config.h"
  21
  22 #include <glib/gmessages.h>
  23 #include <stdlib.h>
  24 #include <glib/giochannel.h>
  25 #include <glib/gerror.h>
  26 #include <popt.h>
  27 #include <string.h>
  28 #include <stdio.h>
  29 #include <locale.h>
  30 #include "captive/options.h"
  31 #include <glib-object.h>
  32 #include "captive/macros.h"
  33 #include <sys/types.h>
  34 #include <sys/stat.h>
  35 #include <unistd.h>
  36 #include <dirent.h>
  37 #include <errno.h>
  38 #include <grp.h>
  39 #include <pwd.h>
  40 #include <fcntl.h>
  41 #include <sys/file.h>
  42 #include <sys/resource.h>
  43 #include <linc/linc-protocol.h> /* for linc_set_tmpdir() */
  44 #include <orbit/orb-core/corba-defs.h>
  45
  46
  47 /* Do not: #include "../../libcaptive/sandbox/split.h"  * for captive_sandbox_fd_closeup(); FIXME *
  48  * as it has libcaptive-dependent includes conditioned by ORBIT2.
  49  * FIXME: Unify this declaration:
  50  */
  51 void captive_sandbox_fd_closeup(int fd_first_to_delete);
  52 void captive_corba_sandbox_child(const gchar *chrooted_orbit_dir);
  53
  54
  55 /* CONFIG: */
  56
  57 /* FIXME: We hit linc-1.0.1/src/linc-protocols.c/linc_protocol_get_sockaddr_unix()
  58  * limit of socket pathname 64 characters.
  59  * With CHROOT_PATH_HASHKEY_LENGTH 12 "linc-%x-%x-%x%x" still does not fit completely.
  60  */
  61 #define CHROOT_PATH_HASHKEY_LENGTH (12)
  62
  63
  64 GQuark sandbox_server_main_error_quark(void)
  65 {
  66 GQuark r=0;
  67
  68         if (!r)
  69                 r=g_quark_from_static_string("sandbox-server");
  70
  71         return r;
  72 }
  73
  74
  75 static gchar *optarg_setuid=CAPTIVE_SANDBOX_SETUID;
  76 static gchar *optarg_setgid=CAPTIVE_SANDBOX_SETGID;
  77 static gchar *optarg_chroot=CAPTIVE_SANDBOX_CHROOT;
  78 static gint   optarg_no_rlimit=0;
  79
  80 static const struct poptOption popt_table[]={
  81 #define SANDBOX_SERVER_POPT(longname,argInfoP,argP,descripP,argDescripP) \
  82                 { \
  83                         longName: (longname), \
  84                         shortName: 0, \
  85                         argInfo: (argInfoP), \
  86                         arg: (void *)argP, \
  87                         val: 0, \
  88                         descrip: (descripP), \
  89                         argDescrip: (argDescripP), \
  90                 }
  91
  92                 SANDBOX_SERVER_POPT("setuid"   ,POPT_ARG_STRING,&optarg_setuid,
  93                                 N_("Username or UID to become; \"-\" for disable"),N_("UID")),
  94                 SANDBOX_SERVER_POPT("setgid"   ,POPT_ARG_STRING,&optarg_setgid,
  95                                 N_("Groupname or GID to become; \"-\" for disable"),N_("GID")),
  96                 SANDBOX_SERVER_POPT("chroot"   ,POPT_ARG_STRING,&optarg_chroot,
  97                                 N_("Pathname to directory for chroot(2); \"-\" for disable"),N_("directory")),
  98                 SANDBOX_SERVER_POPT("no-rlimit",POPT_ARG_NONE  ,&optarg_no_rlimit,
  99                                 N_("Disable setrlimit(2) restrictions"),NULL),
 100
 101 #undef SANDBOX_SERVER_POPT
 102                 POPT_AUTOHELP
 103                 POPT_TABLEEND
 104                 };
 105
 106
 107 static gchar *fatal_argv0;
 108
 109 static void fatal(const char *fmt,...)
 110 {
 111 va_list ap;
 112
 113         fprintf(stderr,"%s: ",fatal_argv0);
 114         va_start(ap,fmt);
 115         vfprintf(stderr,fmt,ap);
 116         va_end(ap);
 117         fprintf(stderr,"!\nAborting!\n");
 118         exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
 119         /* NOTREACHED */
 120         for (;;);
 121 }
 122
 123 static void check_dir_safety(const gchar *dir)
 124 {
 125 gchar *local_dir;
 126 const gchar *cs;
 127 static gint depth=0;
 128
 129         if (++depth>=1000)
 130                 fatal("Loop count >=%d during check_dir_safety(\"%s\")",depth,dir);
 131
 132         if (*dir!='/')
 133                 fatal("chroot path \"%s\" not absolute",dir);
 134         dir=captive_printf_alloca("%s/",dir);
 135         local_dir=(gchar *)captive_strdup_alloca(dir);
 136         for (cs=dir;cs;cs=strchr(cs+1,'/')) {
 137 struct stat statbuf;
 138
 139                 g_assert(*cs=='/');
 140                 /* Include the trailing '/' to resolve the root directory as "/". */
 141                 memcpy(local_dir,dir,cs+1-dir);
 142                 local_dir[cs+1-dir]=0;
 143                 if (lstat(local_dir,&statbuf))
 144                         fatal("lstat(\"%s\") of chroot path component: %m",local_dir);
 145                 if (S_ISLNK(statbuf.st_mode)) {
 146 char linkbuf[PATH_MAX];
 147 int linkbuflen;
 148
 149                         if (0>(linkbuflen=readlink(local_dir,linkbuf,sizeof(linkbuf)-1)))
 150                                 fatal("readlink(\"%s\") of chroot path component: %m",local_dir);
 151                         linkbuf[linkbuflen]=0;
 152                         check_dir_safety(linkbuf);
 153                         if (stat(local_dir,&statbuf))   /* NOT lstat(2) */
 154                                 fatal("stat(\"%s\") of chroot path component: %m",local_dir);
 155                         }
 156                 if (!S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode))
 157                         fatal("lstat/stat(\"%s\") of chroot path component is !S_ISDIR",local_dir);
 158                 if (statbuf.st_uid!=0)
 159                         fatal("lstat/stat(\"%s\") of chroot path component has UID %d !=0",local_dir,(int)statbuf.st_uid);
 160                 if (statbuf.st_gid!=0)
 161                         fatal("lstat/stat(\"%s\") of chroot path component has GID %d !=0",local_dir,(int)statbuf.st_gid);
 162                 if ((statbuf.st_mode&(S_IFDIR|S_ISVTX|0111)) != (S_IFDIR|0111))
 163                         fatal("lstat/stat(\"%s\") of chroot path component has mode 0%o !=04[01]111",local_dir,(int)statbuf.st_mode);
 164                 }
 165
 166         depth--;
 167 }
 168
 169 static void chrooted_unlink_recursive(const gchar *pathname)
 170 {
 171 DIR *dir;
 172 struct dirent *dirent;
 173 static gint depth=0;
 174 struct stat statbuf;
 175
 176         if (++depth>=1000)
 177                 fatal("Loop count >=%d during chrooted_unlink_recursive(\"%s\")",depth,pathname);
 178
 179         /* Security: Do not allow anyone to escape the sandbox directory by symlinks. */
 180         if (lstat(pathname,&statbuf))
 181                 fatal("Cannot lstat(\"%s\") to delete leftover sandbox files: %m",pathname);
 182         if (!S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode)) {
 183                 if (unlink(pathname))
 184                         fatal("Cannot unlink(\"%s\") to delete leftover sandbox files: %m",pathname);
 185                 goto done;
 186                 }
 187         if (!(dir=opendir(pathname)))
 188                 fatal("Cannot opendir(\"%s\") to delete leftover sandbox files: %m",pathname);
 189         while (errno=0,(dirent=readdir(dir))) {
 190 gchar *dirent_path;
 191
 192                 if (!strcmp(dirent->d_name,".") || !strcmp(dirent->d_name,".."))
 193                         continue;
 194                 dirent_path=g_strdup_printf("%s/%s",pathname,dirent->d_name);
 195                 chrooted_unlink_recursive(dirent_path);
 196                 g_free(dirent_path);
 197                 }
 198         if (errno)
 199                 fatal("Cannot readdir(\"%s\") during delete of leftover sandbox files: %m",pathname);
 200         if (closedir(dir))
 201                 fatal("Cannot closedir(\"%s\") during delete of leftover sandbox files: %m",pathname);
 202         if (rmdir(pathname))
 203                 fatal("Cannot rmdir(\"%s\") during delete of leftover sandbox files: %m",pathname);
 204
 205 done:
 206         depth--;
 207 }
 208
 209 static void chrooted_cleanuplockeddirs(const gchar *pathname,const gchar *prefix)
 210 {
 211 DIR *dir;
 212 struct dirent *dirent;
 213
 214         if (!(dir=opendir(pathname))) {
 215                 if (errno!=ENOTDIR)
 216                         fatal("Cannot opendir(\"%s\") to delete leftover sandbox files: %m",pathname);
 217                 /* errno==ENOTDIR, a regular file */
 218                 if (unlink(pathname))
 219                         fatal("Cannot unlink(\"%s\") to delete leftover sandbox files: %m",pathname);
 220                 return;
 221                 }
 222         while (errno=0,(dirent=readdir(dir))) {
 223 gchar *dirent_path;
 224 int direntfd;
 225
 226                 if (!strcmp(dirent->d_name,".") || !strcmp(dirent->d_name,".."))
 227                         continue;
 228                 if (strncmp(dirent->d_name,prefix,strlen(prefix)))
 229                         continue;
 230                 dirent_path=g_strdup_printf("%s/%s",pathname,dirent->d_name);
 231                 if (-1==(direntfd=open(dirent_path,O_RDONLY))) {
 232                         if (errno==ENOENT)      /* It could disappear in the meantime. */
 233                                 goto next_dirent_free_dirent_path;
 234                         fatal("Cannot open(\"%s\") as the child directory during delete of leftover sandbox files: %m",dirent_path);
 235                         }
 236                 if (flock(direntfd,LOCK_EX|LOCK_NB)) {
 237                         if (errno==EWOULDBLOCK) /* Valid directory in use. */
 238                                 goto next_dirent_close_direntfd;
 239                         fatal("Cannot flock(\"%s\",LOCK_EX|LOCK_NB) child directory during delete of leftover sandbox files: %m",dirent_path);
 240                         }
 241                 chrooted_unlink_recursive(dirent_path);
 242 next_dirent_close_direntfd:
 243                 if (close(direntfd))
 244                         fatal("Cannot close(\"%s\") child directory during delete of leftover sandbox files: %m",dirent_path);
 245 next_dirent_free_dirent_path:
 246                 g_free(dirent_path);
 247                 }
 248         if (errno)
 249                 fatal("Cannot readdir(\"%s\") during delete of leftover sandbox files: %m",pathname);
 250         if (closedir(dir))
 251                 fatal("Cannot closedir(\"%s\") during delete of leftover sandbox files: %m",pathname);
 252 }
 253
 254 static void chrooted_createdir(const gchar *dir,uid_t uid,gid_t gid,gboolean lock)
 255 {
 256 gint retries;
 257
 258         for (retries=0;retries<10;retries++) {
 259 struct stat statbuf;
 260 int dirfd;
 261
 262                 if (mkdir(dir,0711)) {
 263                         if (errno!=EEXIST)
 264                                 fatal("Failed to create chroot directory \"%s\": %m",dir);
 265                         chrooted_unlink_recursive(dir);
 266                         if (mkdir(dir,0711))
 267                                 fatal("Failed to create chroot directory \"%s\" after attempted unlink: %m",dir);
 268                         }
 269                 if (!lock)
 270                         break;
 271                 dirfd=open(dir,O_RDONLY);
 272                 if (dirfd==-1) {
 273                         if (errno!=ENOENT)
 274                                 fatal("Failed to open created chroot directory \"%s\" to lock it: %m",dir);
 275                         continue;
 276                         }
 277                 /* Do not use 'LOCK_NB' here as the garbage collector should release it soon. */
 278                 if (flock(dirfd,LOCK_EX))
 279                         fatal("Failed to lock created chroot directory \"%s\": %m",dir);
 280                 if (lstat(dir,&statbuf)) {
 281                         if (errno!=ENOENT)
 282                                 fatal("Failed to lstat(2) created chroot directory \"%s\": %m",dir);
 283                         if (close(dirfd))
 284                                 fatal("Failed to close created and locked chroot directory \"%s\": %m",dir);
 285                         continue;
 286                         }
 287                 /* Leave 'dirfd' open to leave it LOCK_EX-ed. */
 288                 break;
 289                 }
 290         if (chown(dir,uid,gid))
 291                 fatal("Failed to chown(\"%s\",%d,%d): %m",dir,uid,gid);
 292         if (chmod(dir,0711))    /* Just to be safe after chown(2); should be already done by mkdir(2). */
 293                 fatal("Failed to chmod(\"%s\",0%o): %m",dir,0711);
 294 }
 295
 296 static void sandbox_server_rlimit(int resource,const gchar *resource_string,rlim_t rlim_max)
 297 {
 298 struct rlimit rlim;
 299
 300         rlim.rlim_cur=rlim.rlim_max=rlim_max;
 301         if (setrlimit(resource,&rlim))
 302                 fatal("setrlimit(%s,%d): %m",resource_string,(int)rlim_max);
 303         if (getrlimit(resource,&rlim))
 304                 fatal("getrlimit(%s,%d): %m",resource_string,(int)rlim_max);
 305         if (rlim.rlim_cur!=rlim_max || rlim.rlim_max!=rlim_max)
 306                 fatal("Unsuccessful setrlimit(%s)",resource_string);
 307 }
 308
 309 static gchar *chrooted_orbit_dir;
 310
 311 static void chroot_setup(gboolean fragile)
 312 {
 313 uid_t want_uid=0;
 314 const gchar *want_uid_name=NULL;
 315 gid_t want_gid=0;
 316 char *endptr;
 317 const gchar *chroot_pid_hashkey_dir=NULL;
 318
 319         if (fragile) {
 320                 captive_sandbox_fd_closeup(2 /* STDERR */ +1);
 321                 clearenv();
 322                 }
 323
 324 #define CLEANEMPTY(var) G_STMT_START { \
 325                 if ((var) && (!*(var) || *(var)=='-')) \
 326                         (var)=NULL; \
 327                 } G_STMT_END
 328         CLEANEMPTY(optarg_setgid);
 329         CLEANEMPTY(optarg_setuid);
 330         CLEANEMPTY(optarg_chroot);
 331 #undef CLEANEMPTY
 332
 333         if (optarg_setgid) {
 334 long want_gidl;
 335
 336                 want_gidl=strtol(optarg_setgid,&endptr,10);
 337                 if (!endptr || !*endptr) {
 338                         want_gid=want_gidl;
 339                         if (want_gidl<=0 || want_gid!=(gid_t)want_gidl)
 340                                 fatal("Numeric setgid not parsable: %s",optarg_setgid);
 341                         }
 342                 else {
 343 struct group *want_gid_group=NULL;
 344                         if (!(want_gid_group=getgrnam(optarg_setgid)))
 345                                 fatal("Unable to query setgid group name \"%s\"",optarg_setgid);
 346                         want_gid=want_gid_group->gr_gid;
 347                         }
 348                 }
 349
 350         if (optarg_setuid) {
 351 long want_uidl;
 352 struct passwd *want_uid_passwd;
 353                 want_uidl=strtol(optarg_setuid,&endptr,10);
 354                 if (!endptr || !*endptr) {
 355                         want_uid=want_uidl;
 356                         if (want_uidl<=0 || want_uid!=(gid_t)want_uidl)
 357                                 fatal("Numeric setuid not parsable: %s",optarg_setuid);
 358                         }
 359                 else {
 360                         if (!(want_uid_passwd=getpwnam(optarg_setuid)))
 361                                 fatal("Unable to query setuid user name \"%s\"",optarg_setuid);
 362                         want_uid=want_uid_passwd->pw_uid;
 363                         }
 364                 if (!want_uid)
 365                         fatal("Unable to detect setuid UID");
 366                 if (!(want_uid_passwd=getpwuid(want_uid)))
 367                         fatal("Unable to query name of UID %d",(int)want_uid);
 368                 want_uid_name=captive_strdup_alloca(want_uid_passwd->pw_name);
 369                 }
 370
 371         /* Prevent: GLib-WARNING **: getpwuid_r(): failed due to unknown user id (42)
 372          * Try to invoke GLib g_get_any_init() before possible chroot(2) below.
 373          */
 374         g_get_user_name();
 375         g_get_real_name();
 376         g_get_home_dir();
 377         g_get_tmp_dir();
 378
 379         if (fragile && !optarg_chroot)
 380                 fatal("Fragile setuid/root environment but no --chroot set");
 381         if (optarg_chroot) {
 382 const gchar *chroot_pid_dir;
 383 GRand *grand;
 384 gchar chroot_hashkey[CHROOT_PATH_HASHKEY_LENGTH+1],*s;
 385 gint gi;
 386
 387                 check_dir_safety(optarg_chroot);
 388                 if (!(grand=g_rand_new()))      /* I hope g_rand_new() is security-safe. It looks so. */
 389                         fatal("Cannot initialize random number generator g_rand_new()");
 390                 for (s=chroot_hashkey;s<chroot_hashkey+CHROOT_PATH_HASHKEY_LENGTH;s++) {
 391                         gi=g_rand_int_range(grand,0,10+26+26);
 392                         /**/ if (gi>=0 && gi<10)
 393                                 *s='0'+gi-(0);
 394                         else if (gi>=10+0 && gi<10+26)
 395                                 *s='a'+gi-(10);
 396                         else if (gi>=10+26+0 && gi<10+26+26)
 397                                 *s='A'+gi-(10+26);
 398                         else g_assert_not_reached();
 399                         }
 400                 g_rand_free(grand);
 401                 *s=0;
 402                 if (geteuid()==0)       /* Not 'fragile' as we can be native 'root'. */
 403                         chrooted_cleanuplockeddirs(optarg_chroot,"s-");
 404                 chroot_pid_dir=captive_printf_alloca("%s/s-%d",optarg_chroot,(int)getpid());
 405                 chrooted_createdir(chroot_pid_dir,(!optarg_setuid ? (uid_t)-1 : want_uid),(!optarg_setgid ? (gid_t)-1 : want_gid),
 406                                 TRUE);  /* lock */
 407                 chroot_pid_hashkey_dir=captive_printf_alloca("%s/%s",chroot_pid_dir,chroot_hashkey);
 408                 chrooted_createdir(chroot_pid_hashkey_dir,(!optarg_setuid ? (uid_t)-1 : want_uid),(!optarg_setgid ? (gid_t)-1 : want_gid),
 409                                 FALSE); /* lock */
 410                 if (chroot(chroot_pid_hashkey_dir))
 411                         fatal("Failed to chroot(\"%s\"): %m",chroot_pid_hashkey_dir);
 412                 if (chdir("/"))
 413                         fatal("Failed to chdir(\"%s\"): %m","/");
 414                 /* Now it is safe to set umask(0000) as we are protected by 'chroot_hashkey'.
 415                  * We need it to permit our spawning parent to hardlink its sockets to us.
 416                  */
 417                 umask(0000);
 418                 if (umask(0000)!=0000)
 419                         fatal("Failed to set umask(0%o): %m",0000);
 420                 printf("chroot_pid_hashkey_dir=%s\n",chroot_pid_hashkey_dir);
 421                 }
 422
 423         if (fragile && !optarg_setgid)
 424                 fatal("Fragile setuid/root environment but no --setgid set");
 425         if (optarg_setgid) {
 426                 if (!want_gid || setgid(want_gid))
 427                         fatal("Failed to setgid(%d)",(!want_gid ? -1 : (int)want_gid));
 428                 if (setgroups(1 /* size */,&want_gid))
 429                         fatal("Failed to setgroups(1,[%d])",(!want_gid ? -1 : (int)want_gid));
 430                 }
 431         if (fragile && !optarg_setuid)
 432                 fatal("Fragile setuid/root environment but no --setuid set");
 433         if (optarg_setuid) {
 434                 if (!want_uid || setuid(want_uid))
 435                         fatal("Failed to setuid(%d)",(!want_uid ? -1 : (int)want_uid));
 436                 }
 437
 438         /* Prepare /t for /t/o-$PID directories for ORBit2
 439          * and also for parent's hardlink to its /t/o-$pid directory. */
 440         if (optarg_chroot) {
 441 gchar *chrooted_orbit_dir_old,*gs,*gs2;
 442
 443                 if (mkdir("/t",S_ISVTX|0777)) {
 444                         if (errno!=EEXIST)
 445                                 fatal("Failed to mkdir(\"%s\"): %m","/t");
 446                         }
 447                 if (mkdir("/etc",0700))
 448                         fatal("Failed to mkdir(\"%s\"): %m","/etc");
 449                 if (want_uid_name && want_uid && want_gid) {
 450 FILE *f;
 451                         if (!(f=fopen("/etc/passwd","w")))
 452                                 fatal("Failed to fopen(\"%s\",\"w\"): %m","/etc/passwd");
 453                         if (0>fprintf(f,"%s:*:%d:%d:%s:%s:/bin/false\n",want_uid_name,(int)want_uid,(int)want_gid,want_uid_name,optarg_chroot))
 454                                 fatal("Failed to fprintf(\"%s\"): %m","/etc/passwd");
 455                         if (fclose(f))
 456                                 fatal("Failed to fclose(\"%s\"): %m","/etc/passwd");
 457                         }
 458                 g_assert(chroot_pid_hashkey_dir!=NULL);
 459                 chrooted_orbit_dir=g_strdup_printf("%s/t/o-%d",chroot_pid_hashkey_dir,getpid());
 460                 /* Missing mkdir(2) of the last component path is intentional: */
 461                 for (gs=chrooted_orbit_dir;(gs2=strchr(gs,'/'));gs=gs2) {
 462                         *gs2='\0';
 463                         if (*chrooted_orbit_dir && mkdir(chrooted_orbit_dir,S_ISVTX|0777)) {
 464                                 if (errno!=EEXIST)
 465                                         fatal("Failed to mkdir(\"%s\"): %m",chrooted_orbit_dir);
 466                                 }
 467                         *gs2++='/';
 468                         }
 469                 /* Prepare '/tmp' for the initial CORBA_ORB_init() default path: */
 470                 if (mkdir("/tmp",S_ISVTX|0777)) {
 471                         if (errno!=EEXIST)
 472                                 fatal("Failed to mkdir(\"%s\"): %m","/tmp");
 473                         }
 474                 /* Set '0700' to prevent: Wrong permissions for ...
 475                  * by linc-1.0.1-1/src/linc-protocols.c/make_local_tmpdir()
 476                  */
 477                 if (mkdir(chrooted_orbit_dir,0700)) {
 478                         /* Do not: g_assert(errno==EEXIST);
 479                          * as if 'optarg_chroot' the whole chroot(2)ed directory should be ours.
 480                          */
 481                         fatal("Cannot created chrooted_orbit_dir \"%s\": %m",chrooted_orbit_dir);
 482                         }
 483                 /* Init 'orb' to pass through its linc_set_tmpdir() to not to be overriden below. */
 484                 {
 485 CORBA_ORB orb;
 486 CORBA_Environment ev;
 487 int orb_argc=1;
 488 gchar *orb_argv[]={
 489                 (gchar *)captive_strdup_alloca("captive-sandbox-server"),
 490                 NULL};
 491
 492                         CORBA_exception_init(&ev);
 493                         orb=CORBA_ORB_init(&orb_argc,orb_argv,"orbit-local-orb",&ev);
 494                         if (orb==CORBA_OBJECT_NIL)
 495                                 fatal("Cannot initialize CORBA ORB (CORBA_OBJECT_NIL): %m");
 496                         if (ev._major!=CORBA_NO_EXCEPTION)
 497                                 fatal("Cannot initialize CORBA ORB (exception): %m");
 498                         }
 499                 chrooted_orbit_dir_old=linc_get_tmpdir();       /* returns g_strdup()ed string */
 500                 g_assert(chrooted_orbit_dir_old!=NULL);
 501                 linc_set_tmpdir(chrooted_orbit_dir);
 502                 if (rmdir(chrooted_orbit_dir_old))
 503                         fatal("Cannot remove old chrooted_orbit_dir \"%s\": %m",chrooted_orbit_dir_old);
 504                 g_free(chrooted_orbit_dir_old);
 505                 /* chmod(2) it to prevent mode limitation by
 506                  * active ulimit(2) of being executed by mount(8).
 507                  */
 508                 /* Set '0777' as our parent does not have 'captive' user permissions. */
 509                 if (chmod(chrooted_orbit_dir,S_ISVTX|0777))
 510                         fatal("Cannot chmod 0%o chrooted_orbit_dir \"%s\": %m",S_ISVTX|0777,chrooted_orbit_dir);
 511                 printf("chrooted_orbit_dir=%s\n",chrooted_orbit_dir);
 512                 }
 513
 514         if (fragile || !optarg_no_rlimit) {
 515 #define SANDBOX_SERVER_RLIMIT(what,how) sandbox_server_rlimit((what),G_STRINGIFY(what),(how))
 516                 SANDBOX_SERVER_RLIMIT(RLIMIT_NPROC,0);
 517                 SANDBOX_SERVER_RLIMIT(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,0);
 518                 SANDBOX_SERVER_RLIMIT(RLIMIT_CORE,0);
 519                 SANDBOX_SERVER_RLIMIT(RLIMIT_FSIZE,0);
 520                 SANDBOX_SERVER_RLIMIT(RLIMIT_NOFILE,6); /* >=6 */
 521                 /* FIXME: Why flock(dirfd,...) in chrooted_createdir() succeeds?: */
 522                 SANDBOX_SERVER_RLIMIT(RLIMIT_LOCKS,0);
 523 #undef SANDBOX_SERVER_RLIMIT
 524                 }
 525
 526         if (fragile) {
 527 gid_t gid_list[2];
 528 int gid_list_size,i;
 529
 530                 if (getuid()!=want_uid)
 531                         fatal("getuid()=%d != want_uid=%d",(int)getuid(),(int)want_uid);
 532                 if (geteuid()!=want_uid)
 533                         fatal("geteuid()=%d != want_uid=%d",(int)geteuid(),(int)want_uid);
 534                 if (getgid()!=want_gid)
 535                         fatal("getgid()=%d != want_gid=%d",(int)getgid(),(int)want_gid);
 536                 if (getegid()!=want_gid)
 537                         fatal("getegid()=%d != want_gid=%d",(int)getegid(),(int)want_gid);
 538                 gid_list_size=getgroups(G_N_ELEMENTS(gid_list),gid_list);
 539                 for (i=0;i<gid_list_size;i++) {
 540                         if (gid_list[i]!=want_gid)
 541                                 fatal("getgroups() list member @%d %d != want_gid=%d",i,(int)gid_list[i],(int)want_gid);
 542                         }
 543                 }
 544 }
 545
 546
 547 int main(int argc,char **argv)
 548 {
 549 poptContext context;
 550 int errint;
 551 const char *cmd_arg;
 552 struct captive_options options;
 553 gboolean fragile;
 554
 555         g_log_set_always_fatal(~(0
 556                         |G_LOG_LEVEL_MESSAGE
 557                         |G_LOG_LEVEL_INFO
 558                         |G_LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG
 559                         ));
 560
 561         fatal_argv0=argv[0];
 562         fragile=(getuid()!=geteuid() || getuid()==0 || geteuid()==0);
 563
 564 #ifndef MAINTAINER_MODE
 565         if (fragile && (argc!=1 || argv[1]))
 566                 fatal("Arguments invalid as running in fragile setuid/root environment");
 567
 568         if (fragile)
 569                 chroot_setup(TRUE);
 570 #endif /* MAINTAINER_MODE */
 571
 572         /* Initialize the i18n stuff */
 573         setlocale(LC_ALL,"");
 574         bindtextdomain(PACKAGE,LOCALEDIR);
 575         textdomain(PACKAGE);
 576
 577         /* Initialize GObject subsystem of GLib. */
 578         g_type_init();
 579
 580         captive_options_init(&options);
 581         captive_options=&options;       /* for parsing by 'CAPTIVE_POPT_INCLUDE' */
 582
 583         context=poptGetContext(
 584                         PACKAGE,        /* name */
 585                         argc,(/*en-const*/const char **)argv,   /* argc,argv */
 586                         popt_table,     /* options */
 587                         POPT_CONTEXT_POSIXMEHARDER);    /* flags; && !POPT_CONTEXT_KEEP_FIRST */
 588         if (context==NULL) {
 589                 g_assert_not_reached(); /* argument recognization args_error */
 590                 return EXIT_FAILURE;
 591                 }
 592         errint=poptReadDefaultConfig(context,
 593                         TRUE);  /* useEnv */
 594         if (errint!=0) {
 595                 g_assert_not_reached(); /* argument recognization args_error */
 596                 return EXIT_FAILURE;
 597                 }
 598         errint=poptGetNextOpt(context);
 599         if (errint!=-1) {
 600                 g_assert_not_reached(); /* some non-callbacked argument reached */
 601                 return EXIT_FAILURE;
 602                 }
 603         cmd_arg=poptPeekArg(context);
 604         if (cmd_arg) {
 605                 g_assert_not_reached(); /* some non-option argument reached */
 606                 return EXIT_FAILURE;
 607                 }
 608         /* 'cmd_arg'-style args gets cleared by 'poptFreeContext(context);' below */
 609         poptFreeContext(context);
 610
 611 #ifdef MAINTAINER_MODE
 612         chroot_setup(FALSE);
 613 #endif /* MAINTAINER_MODE */
 614
 615         captive_options=NULL;   /* already parsed by 'CAPTIVE_POPT_INCLUDE' */
 616
 617         captive_corba_sandbox_child(chrooted_orbit_dir);
 618
 619         g_assert_not_reached();
 620         return EXIT_SUCCESS;
 621 }